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This paper draws on socio-institutional research on accounting technology. It underlines the 
ability of one type of accounting technology (performance measurement technology) to be a 
base for control at a distance since this technology links together discourse and calculation. 
Failures in this link are analysed thanks to a case study of the pharmaceutical industry.  The 
sales teams of eleven global pharmaceutical laboratories located in France are investigated. 
Translation theory is used as an analytical framework to argue that (1) technologies of control 
at a distance lead to an illusion of external control, (2) control at a distance is nevertheless 
fostered by the substitution of individual resources, the codification and the integration 
exerted by technology, and (3) these features, combined with ideal beliefs relating to 
technology, lead individuals to develop self-control. Therefore, the illusion of external control 
developed by technology is compensated by the growing self-control of individuals, which is, 
in fact, the most efficient way of getting people to do things. Technologies of control at a 





This research paper revisits the articulation between distance and control. This is an age-old 
issue. The Habsburg Empire, the largest centralised system in the 16
th and 17
th centuries, 
already showed signs of the difficulty in maintaining control at a distance. The Emperor of 
Spain had great difficulty in maintaining control of far-flung territories that stretched as far as 
California and Argentina. In 1925, Merriman
1 observed that distance prevented the Emperor 
from applying his laws (Beniger, 1997, p.122). The problem of articulation between distance 
and control can be found in the contemporary firm too, whether it is in the proliferation of so-
called virtual organisations or in the current problem of balancing autonomy and coordination 
first addressed by Sloan at General Motors and by Du Pont at Du Pont de Nemours (Chandler, 
1962; Bouquin, 1997, p.23). Given these situations, control at a distance is made possible 
through the use of technologies. A closer look at the Latin roots of the verb ‘to control’ 
(controratulare) shows a sense of testing something “against the rolls”, comparing it to the 
cylinders of paper that served as official records in ancient times (Beniger, 1997, p.8). 
Technology is therefore the support on which control at a distance leans.  
 
The research question that drives this paper is the following: to what extent do technologies 
resolve the problems of control at a distance?  
To answer this question, we call on the findings of a case study on technologies for measuring 
the performance of sales forces in the pharmaceutical industry. Action at a distance and/or 
accounting technologies have been the subject of several studies in the healthcare sector, but 
almost exclusively in public health-care organizations (Covaleski M. A. et.al., 1993; Chua, 
1995; Kurunmäki, 1999; Scott et al., 2000; Kurunmäki 2004). Research papers that study 
accounting technologies in the context of the private healthcare sector are uncommon. 
However, accounting technologies deployed in pharmaceutical laboratories, as much as those 
                                                 
1 Merriman (1925), The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New, vol.3: The Emperor, 
Macmillan, p.659, in Beniger (1997) 
  1in public healthcare organisations, reflect a need for conformity with social, economic and 
political expectations and an imperative to display a rationality of practices (Dambrin et al., 
forthcoming). The sales sector in the pharmaceutical industry is particularly affected by the 
problematics of control at a distance both for structural reasons (drugs are prescribed by 
doctors who are not the direct purchasers of the goods produced by the pharmaceutical 
industry) and for legal reasons (persons who visit doctors in France do not have the status of 
sales representatives but that of medical informers and they cannot, therefore, sign order 
forms; furthermore, the law forbids any divulging of nominative prescriptions). As a result, 
the link between a drug representative’s visit to a doctor and the prescriptions that this doctor 
will subsequently write cannot be clearly traced. This entails a series of problems of control at 
a distance since no laboratory can ever say that a given pharmacy has sold a given drug from 
the prescription written by a given doctor. Our case study seeks to understand the role that the 
multiple performance measurement technologies available to pharmaceutical laboratories play 
in managing these problems of control at a distance.  
 
The traditional view of organisational control (notably the view provided by agency theory 
and transaction cost theory) does not overlook the importance of technology and the 
importance of what feeds it (information) to understand control. However, the way in which it 
envisages the link between information and control most often translates a misunderstanding 
of the social dimensions of technology. Yet technology is inextricably tied to social 
relationships since it models them (Miller, 1994, p.1). At the level of the firm, it creates norms 
and legitimises managerial choices (Boussard & Maugeri, 2003, p.58). At the level of society, 
it is a constitutive part of the political world and its general instruments of decision-making 
and power (Sfez, 2002, p.85, 103). Technologies of control, like those of accounting, flow 
from social and institutional practice. They reflect and reproduce a society’s values at a given 
moment in its history and they reveal processes of social structuring (Miller, 1994). This 
paper ascribes to research that demonstrates the myth according to which control technologies 
are fully mastered by their users. It aims to update trends in normalisation and self-control 
that technologies are able to engender. Works that envisage the socio-institutional dimensions 
of accounting technologies point to phenomena of self-regulation of behaviours (Miller & 
O’Leary, 1987, 1994b; Miller & Rose, 1990; Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Loft, 1986; Robson 
1992). However, in-depth case studies that empirically uncover the existence and workings of 
phenomena of individual self-control brought about by the control technologies used in firms 
are few in number (Knights & Collinson, 1987; Barker, 1993; Perlow, 1998; Deetz, 1998). 
Our aim is to contribute to the empirical understanding of self-control phenomena brought 
about by technologies. In addition, by studying the case of a sector, we wish to enrich the 
theoretical construction of the concepts of translation and control at a distance.  
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we highlight the role of technology in 
control at a distance and the relevance of translation theory in addressing our research 
question (1). We then present the case study background and describe our research and data-
gathering method (2). Section 3 provides our findings regarding the role of technology in 
control at a distance. It is argued that technologies of control at a distance lead to an illusion 
of external control (3.1). However, control at a distance is enabled by the substitution of 
resources, the codification and integration technologies exert, crossed with two ideals imputed 
on technology (permanent surveillance and truth through quantification) (3.2). These features 
lead individuals to develop self-control, which is the ‘true nature’ and aim of control at a 
distance (3.3). The final section is devoted to a discussion on the interpretations of governing 
through technology suggested in our results. 
 
  21. Theoretical Framework: Control at a Distance through 
Technology 
1.1. Control at a distance 
 
Control at a distance is sometimes defined as the inverse of control through presence. Heading 
General Motors from 1921 to 1956, Sloan mentions in a concrete manner the difficulties of 
management that stem from the distance between the firm’s managers and its factories, 
suppliers and dealers. If, during an on-site visit, he discovers malfunctions such as an 
excessive build-up of stocks at a dealership, he can only take control by going to the control 
subjects and must rely on other tools (financial reporting, planning, etc.) (Chandler, 1962). 
Sloan is aware of the risks tied to the field being remote. Like other precursors of 
commanding at a distance, he sets about finding systems that enable him to supervise from a 
greater distance whilst having greater control (Bouquin, 1997, p.10, 11-40). Referring to the 
experiences of the first great corporate directors in the United States, Chandler contrasts 
control at a distance exercised by senior management over its divisions by means of 
management control and control through presence that helps to mitigate the insufficiencies of 
financial and statistical methods in the exercising of control. Therefore, a distinction can be 
made between “financial and statistical reports” that feed control at a distance and “on-site 
tours […] to visit factories, to see suppliers, and in particular, to talk with distributors” that 
exemplify control through presence (Chandler, 1962). Control at a distance is therefore a form 
of continuous control, impersonal, proceeding in the absence of face-to-face contact with 
supervisors and management (Robson, 1992, p.700). 
 
However, control at a distance and control through presence are not alternatives, but 
complements (Cohen, 2002). Control at a distance is not the inverse of control through 
presence because, even when the source of influence and the control subject are present, 
elements that are not directly visible to the source of influence remain. Even in the presence 
of the control subject, the one exerting control does not necessarily possess the know-how, the 
interpersonal relationships and the information flows required to control the behaviour of the 
control subject and maintain the unpredictability of his own behaviour. Control at a distance 
may therefore be required when the control subject and the source of influence are present but 
are at a distance from relevant resources
2 (Dambrin, 2005, p.33-41). As stipulated by Robson, 
“action at a distance implies not merely physical space between two points, but the capacity, 
through ‘strong’ explanations, to influence many contexts at the same time.” (Robson, 1992, 
p.691). Whether in terms of time-space or relevant resources, distance between 
representations and their referents is the fundamental problem for action and control.  
 
Control at a distance as envisaged in this paper refers to a social practice since it is a question 
of using it to give members of an organisation a view of individuals’ behaviours at a distance 
and orientate these behaviours. In this respect, control at a distance does not solely rely on a 
set of techniques or control tools. Control at a distance deploys through technologies and not 
techniques, because it instils a non-neutral, structuring language that ascribes to a quest for 
legitimisation. In this paper, the technologies of control at a distance we study are 
                                                 
2 A resource is relevant if controlling it conditions the capacity of action of one or another person (Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1977, p.72). For example, “it is pointless knowing how to play the violin in a mechanic’s workshop” 
(p.80); this is an irrelevant resource in such a context. Crozier and Friedberg discern four types of relevant 
resources within an organisation: mastery of specific competences, mastery of relationships between the 
organisation and its environment, the holding of information, and the use of organisational rules (p.83).  
  3performance measurement technologies. They are seen in the light of the French tradition of 
the sociology of management instruments, meaning as instruments having an invisible and 
structuring impact (Berry, 1983) or else as systemic articulations between objects and 
discourses (Boussard & Maugeri, 2003, p.28). These technologies form part of the accounting 
devices that provide a regular form of surveillance (Loft, 1986) and that operate as numerical 
inscription devices for long-distance control (Robson, 1992, p.703). 
1.2. The role of technology in control at a distance 
 
With the problem of distance arises the issue of the media through which it is possible to 
influence contexts or situations remote from the actor (Robson, 1992, P.701). Technology is 
therefore the medium necessary for control at a distance.  
Why have we chosen the term ‘technology’ rather than ‘technique’ or ‘tool’? The etymology 
of the word ‘technology’ confirms the fact that technology encompasses the notions of 
techniques and tools. Technology is the discourse that is made using techniques. The word 
derives from the Ancient Greek “teknologia” meaning “a treatise or essay on an art form, a 
presentation of the rules of an art”. Today, the term ‘technology’ tends to be used to denote “a 
cutting-edge technique, modern and complex, otherwise any modern technique, with a 
connotation of progress, whether in advertising or politics.” (Rey, 2000, p.3773). 
Contemporary usage of the term ‘technology’ therefore reveals confusion with the term 
‘technique’, whereas the two terms cover different areas. The term technique covers the tools, 
the practical arts, at the point where technology also touches on their social implications and 
the language they bring into play. Technology is a series of discourses or stories that 
legitimise the existing order (Sfez, 2002).  
 
For several scholars, control at a distance equates to control through the use of a particular 
technology: employing accounting information. McSweeny thus describes the exercising of 
control at a distance through “management by accounting”. Promoted in Great Britain from 
1982 by the Financial Management Initiative (FMI), such “management by accounting” sets 
out to designate individual responsibilities, set goals and evaluate costs and production in 
order to programme, assess, and manage events (McSweeny, 1994, p.238). Johnson describes 
how control at a distance (which he names “remote control”) functions in the following way: 
managers start from the principle that they control the activities carried out in the firm using 
the accounting information that they receive in the similar way to a driver using his rear-view 
mirror to drive or a tennis player monitoring the score board during a match (Johnson, 1992, 
p.21). In his view, control at a distance is defined as managing behaviours using accounting 
information.  
 
The role of technologies in control at a distance is particularly well analysed in historical 
research focusing on the development of accounting and control technologies in pioneering 
factories. Hoskin and Macve have identified the birth pains of technologies that enabled 
control at a distance in the Pennsylvanian railroads developed by Herman Haupt in the early 
1850s. By means of a division-based structure combined with a constant use of accounting 
and calculating techniques, Haupt implemented a control system “which made his presence 
not indispensable” (Hoskin & Macve, 1994, p.90). Citing the example of the development of 
time-recording technologies in factories, Loft asserts that technology enables “the shop floor 
to be brought into the office”. Due to time-recording technologies, everything that takes place 
on the shop floor is, in a manner of speaking, shifted to the managers’ offices and the office 
becomes the powerful calculating centre where all these times are recorded (Loft, 1999, p.11). 
In a similar vein, Yates describes how the systematic management systems that began to 
  4develop at the end of the 19
th century enabled managers to reassert control over production 
that was, at that time, in the hands of semi-autonomous foremen or skilled workers (Yates, 
1989, p.11). Cohen mentions the case of Mattern, a production manager at Peugeot at the end 
of the 1920s, who, whilst still advocating “command through presence”, used graphs to 
analyse the results of the previous day’s work. Cohen also refers to “Du Pont’s amazing chart 
room
3 in which large-format graphs, hanging from rails, can be presented with a simple 
gesture to members of the board of directors sat in a row of armchairs”. He qualifies these 
rooms as an “architectural innovation of management typical of command at a distance” 
(Cohen, 2002, p.10-11). Reporting, diagrams and graphs, photographs, and payroll systems 
are just a small number of the technologies of control at a distance praised by the industrialists 
who were drawn to the principles of scientific management (Cohen, 2002, p.9). All these 
technologies aim to make the senior manager indirectly present whenever he cannot be 
directly present.  
 
Anglo-Saxon research has highlighted many good examples of technologies taking part in 
governing individuals at a distance in the firm and, more broadly, in society: rating and 
statistics transferred to calculation and assessment centres (Miller & Rose, 1990, p.5); 
management control technologies structured into responsibility centres (Miller, 1994, p.2 and 
6; Lowe & Machin, 1983); the spatial reorganisation of a factory (Miller & O’Leary, 1994b); 
accounting technologies such as standard costs and budgetary processes (Miller & O’Leary, 
1987; 1994) or, more generally, accounting inscriptions (Robson, 1992); ‘personnel 
management technologies’ (Townley, 1995) such as appraisal procedures and standardised 
training (Miller & Rose, 1990, p.8).  
 
The common feature of these technologies is to link inextricably numbers and words. They 
encapsulate one part calculation and one part discussion, intertwined one with the other.  
1.3. Technology performs a translation to enable control at a distance 
 
Latour provides the link between the various scholars mentioned above to describe the 
technologies of control at a distance that arise at different eras and are exerted on different 
control subjects. Indeed, he raises a question that overarches the underlying questions of the 
aforementioned scholars: How can we act at a distance with regard to events, places and 
people that are not familiar to us? His answer constitutes a definition of how control at a 
distance functions: “by bringing these events, these places and these people close to us by 
whatever means.” (Latour, 1989, p.534
4). Using the example of the European cartographers 
who, through cartography, developed their States’ control over distant and unknown lands, 
Latour describes how “the world comes to the office worker, instead of the office worker 
going to the world” (Latour, 1989, p.537).  
 
It is through a process of translation that such action at a distance is made possible. 
Translation refers to the relations that are essentially constructions between the inscription 
and the events, objects and activities to which it refers (Callon, 1980, p.211; 1986). 
In this definition, what is the link with control at a distance? Translation suggests the role of 
distance; it “signals the notion of movement or displacement from one context to another” 
(Robson, 1992, p.691). This movement is not solely spatial. Undoubtedly, geographical 
distance is a convenient historical example to understand how control at a distance functions 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed description of Du Pont’s “chart rooms”, see Yates (Yates, 1985; Yates, 1989, pp.266-267). 
4 In italics in the text. Quotes from the French edition. English edition: Latour B. (1987), Science in action, 
Harvard University Press 
  5(see the example of the cartographers used by Latour or Law), but notably in the 
organisational context, it is clear that this distance equally concerns a difference in terms of 
power and of interest. Translation therefore steps in as a support for control at a distance in 
ambiguous situations in which “the actors decide to launch into the production of emerging 
knowledge”: “B can only see utility in the knowledge produced by A if A launches into the 
task of giving B an incentive. A translates B: he sets out to convince him […] that it is in his 
interest to go through the competences produced by A. In these incentive strategies, what is 
negotiated is obviously whatever both A and B really want and whatever their goals and 
whatever the programmes they undertake to reach these goals are” (Callon, 1999, p.41). Thus, 
“the operation of translation consists of combining two hitherto different interests […] to form 
a single composite goal” (Latour, 1999, p.88). The process of translation, defined by Callon 
and Latour, enables the calculations made in one place to be linked to an action carried out in 
another place, not through force but through a subtle networking of agents and agencies 
(Miller & Rose, 1990, p.9-10). It is a matter of ‘translation’ because the individual “targeted” 
by the action at a distance is to translate the goals and values of others (the one who seeks to 
act at a distance) into his own terms (Miller & Rose, 1990, p.10).  
 
In the last decade, a number of accounting scholars have employed the theory of translation to 
account for the socio-institutional dimensions of accounting. Early adopters, such as Miller 
(1991), Robson (1991, 1992) and Preston et al. (1992) have been followed by Chua (1995), 
Mouritsen et al. (2001), Jeacle (2003) and Ezzamel et al. (2004a). Some scholars refer to this 
process of translation to describe the centralised decentralisation within the firm that arises 
with action at a distance. They also consider the various formalisations of control in the firm 
(reporting, financial and accounting statements) as the outcomes of a process of translation 
(Robson, 1992; Quattrone & Hopper, 2005). In our study, we focus on one particular aspect of 
the process of translation: the way in which technologies ensure the coherence of inscriptions, 
in the sense suggested by Robson. Inscription refers to the material and graphical 
representations that constitute the accounting report: writing, numbers, lists, tables (Robson, 
1992, p.685). A lack of correspondence between the inscriptions and the objects to which they 
refer, between the forms of explanation “here” and the objects to which they refer “out there”, 
between representations and their referents, is a problem for those who wish to act at a 
distance (Latour, 1989). 
 
Robson recalls that action at a distance is conditioned by the strength of the explanations that 
we are able to call upon. This strength does not lie in the exact correspondence of our 
explanations with the reality of the facts that we seek to explain; it lies in the explanation’s 
potential to influence. “To achieve such strong explanations it is necessary to move or 
translate elements from each setting so as to construct powerful explanations via the 
inscription.” (Robson, 1992, p.701). Translation therefore relies on persuasion, intrigue, 
calculation or rhetoric.  Language is essential in the process of translation because it is 
through the sharing of vocabulary, theories and explanations that loose and flexible networks 
of agents are created (Miller & Rose, 1990, p.10).  
 
In our study, we consider inscriptions to be a production of control technologies. Our aim is to 
see to what extent control technologies regulate, or not, the situations in which the 
inscriptions do not correspond to the objects they are meant to represent. Driving this 
ambition is the desire to revisit the nature of control at a distance. We have previously 
underlined the importance of technologies in control at a distance. Which features of control 
technologies enable us to support the process of translation that underlies control at a 
distance? In a situation of control at a distance, technologies must bring the control subjects 
  6closer to the source of influence “by inventing the means that: a) make them mobile so as to 
be able to move them; b) make them stable so as to be able to move them in all directions 
without distortion, loss or additional corruption, and; c) make them combinable so that we 
may cumulate them, bring them together and shuffle them like a deck of cards, regardless of 
how they are constituted.” (Latour, 1989, p.534
5). Therefore, there are three major and 
interrelated qualities that allow forms of inscription to assist action at a distance: mobility, 
stability and combinability (Robson, 1992, p.692-700). It is the role played by control 
technologies in these three qualities of inscriptions in the pharmaceutical industry that we will 
now investigate.  
 
 
2.  Methodology: Translation Theory as an Analytical 
Device to Study the Role of Technology in Control at a 
Distance 
 
In the pharmaceutical industry, the translation process is based on networks and information 
centres. It calls for experts who, alone, can help individuals to translate the interests of an 
institution or other individuals into their own terms. Networks of alliances with common 
interests, information centres and their relevant experts, all help individuals to assimilate 
constraints in their field of activity imposed by an institution or a person. There is one domain 
in particular where control at a distance raises problems and is embodied in a number of 
technologies: measuring the performance of the sales force (the drug representatives).  
In the translation process underpinning control at a distance, networks, centres and experts use 
performance measurement technology made up of a calculative part (tekne) and a discursive 
part (logos). It is the coherence of the articulation between these two parts that we want to 
investigate and analyse in this paper since we believe it is the basis of control at a distance. 
2.1. Case study background: problems of control at a distance in the pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
The main problem of control at a distance with regard to the sales force in the pharmaceutical 
industry lies in the fact that we cannot draw a clear link between a drug representative’s visit 
to a doctor and the prescriptions that the doctor will write subsequently to the visit. No 
laboratory can state that a given pharmacy sold a given drug due to a prescription from a 
given doctor. Medicines are prescribed by doctors who are not the direct purchasers of the 
goods produced by the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, pharmaceutical laboratories lack 
individual information resulting from invoicing arrangements. Normal client relationship 
management linked to ordering and invoicing is therefore not applicable. Yet it is not the 
multiplicity of intermediaries in the sales circuit that is the basic cause of problems of control 
at a distance. The reasons are of a legal order. In France, due to their status, drug 
representatives leave their visits without a signed order form or any guarantee of prescriptions 
on the part of the doctor; at best, they may have a promise of prescriptions
6. For doctors and 
                                                 
5 In italics in the text. 
6  Officially, drug representatives are not salespeople.  Drug reps are, “persons who provide information or 
conduct prospecting for medical treatment [and] must possess sufficient scientific knowledge certified by a 
diploma, title or certificate that is included in a list drawn up by the administrative authority”, article L5122-11 
of the French public health code. The Public Health Law of 18
th January 1994 specifies that the drug 
  7specialists in community healthcare, there exist only roundabout and unverifiable means to 
find out their level of prescription (market studies, informal discussions with doctors and 
pharmacists).  
The same can be said for measuring the return on investment for promotional operations. The 
return in terms of medical prescriptions from a Professional Relationship (PR)
7 cannot be 
measured formally and directly. The drug representatives (DR) of pharmaceutical laboratories 
talk of “deals”, of “moral contracts” between themselves and the doctors invited, but it stays 
in the realm of what cannot be directly measured. Measuring performance is all the more 
sensitive when the laboratory monitors data for individual performances. Today, most 
pharmaceutical laboratories organise their sales forces into networks. A geographical zone of 
doctors is taken on by three or more DRs who will go and see the same doctors with the 
underlying assumption that increasing the number of visits raises the probability of 
prescription. In this type of organisational structure, it is impossible to measure with 
reliability what share of turnover may be attributed to a given drug representative in the 
network. It may be argued that the laboratory does not need to know the individual 
performance of DRs; however, if organising the sales force functions on the basis of a 
network, the remuneration for performance still hinges on very individual criteria (rankings of 
DRs, individual bonuses), hence potential problems of control at a distance between collective 
activity and remuneration of individual performance.  
 
In addition, pharmaceutical laboratories do not have access to prescriptions. The CNIL, the 
French body regulating privacy rights for electronic information, bans the sharing of 
nominative medical prescriptions, whether it involves the laboratories or the providers of sales 
statistics, leading to a second problem of control of sales forces at a distance. The 
performance of turnover per client (doctor) cannot be ascertained. The sales statistics 
available on the market cover either prescriptions extrapolated from groups of anonymous 
doctors or orders from groups of pharmacies. To obtain these statistics, the laboratories must 
buy them from service providers. These service providers must themselves call on a trusted 
third party to obtain the data that are made anonymous and consolidated beforehand
8. Once 
again, no traceable link can be established between the medical prescription and the turnover 
of the laboratory. First of all, a medical prescription does not necessarily entail a purchase by 
the patient. Furthermore, if there is a purchase, it may occur for a product other than the one 
prescribed (notably, if an equivalent generic exists and if the pharmacist exercises his right to 
substitute one product for another). The purchase may also take place in a pharmacy that is 
not in the same geographical zone as the doctor, which then raises the problem of measuring 
the performances of DRs. Finally, orders from the pharmacy (for which data are available) are 
not the same as the turnover achieved by the laboratory. Although returns of unsold products 
are rare, they may nonetheless arise notably in the case of a product sold directly by the 
laboratory (and not by a wholesale distributor) or of products at the end of their life cycle. 
Moreover, significant time delays occur between the amount ordered by the pharmacy and the 
laboratory’s real turnover from the pharmacy, notably at the end of business cycles when DRs 
become more active with pharmacists with whom they have developed cordial relationships in 
order to maximise their bonuses.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
representative must possess a national diploma for drug representation, a university degree or a medical degree 
provided by certain faculties of medicine, pharmacy or science. 
7 Professional Relationships are evening or weekend events proposed free-of-charge to a group of doctors with 
the aim of increasing their potential to prescribe. PRs are paid as overtime to the DR who organises them and 
participates in them. 
8 Réseau Pharma is the trusted third party for pharmacists in France. 
  8Consequently, the chain of cause and effect that is established between the tasks of a drug 
representative (the visit, professional relationships) and the essential criterion for measuring 
his performance (turnover achieved in his geographical zone) is replete with weak links 
between calculations and discourses. Do sales of a given drug at a pharmacy really correspond 
to the performance of a drug representative who can only encourage doctors in the local area 
to prescribe it? 
The diagram below presents a summary of the problems of control at a distance to which the 
pharmaceutical laboratories are exposed when faced with articulating calculation and 
discourse. The rectangles denote what pertains to situations that lead to inscriptions of a 
discursive order. For instance, a visit leads to the use of a sales pitch and the writing and 
sending through the reporting line of a report on the visit by the DR. The ovals denote what 
pertains to calculations. The question marks signpost the problems of linking the two, 























•  Is there a prescription after a DR 
visit or a PR?  
•  If so, how much?  
•  If so, which doctor prescribed? 
•  If the DRs are in a network, which 
DR brought about this prescription 
(if DR network)? 
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•  Is there a purchase after prescription? 
•  If so, does the purchase correspond to what 
is prescribed (pharmacist’s right to 
substitute products, patient’s wishes)  
•  If so, does the purchase take place in the 
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Figure 1 Flawed articulations between control and discourse: a summary of problems of control at a 
distance of sales forces in the pharmaceutical industry 
 
To mitigate these problems of control at a distance, the pharmaceutical laboratories gamble on 
the large range of performance measurement technologies on offer.  
This range of technologies is based on an ideal of quantification that includes all the actors in 
the sector, including doctors. In France, each doctor is identified by a code. This code and its 
corresponding data (coordinates, speciality, etc.) feed the doctor classification files used by 
the pharmaceutical laboratories. The doctors are the subjects of quantification according to 
their potential (light, medium, or heavy prescriber). This results in targeting. Consequently, 
although the law bans the diffusion of medical prescriptions that indicate the name of the 
doctor and the patient, prescription potential is subject to recurrent calculations. Each DR 
possesses a targeting of doctors. On this targeting, the standard behaviour of the DR is laid 
out (the norms of activity in terms of number of contacts) with which compliance is measured 
using reporting technologies. Everything is subjected to quantifying in the DR’s activity. The 
  9competences of DRs are quantified by means of rating scales dealing with elements as diverse 
and as subjective as “knowledge, know-how-to-do, and know-how-to-be” (at firm A). The 
activities of members of the sales force are equally quantified in reporting as days of activity. 
These calculations contribute to governing the individual because they are compared with the 
goals set with a view to an individual appraisal. For instance, during the annual appraisal, the 
quantification of competences results in the calculation of an overall rating conditioning the 
attribution of a pay rise.  
2.2. Data collection and analysis 
 
In light of this context (sensitive control at a distance of sales forces and range of technologies 
to mitigate this difficulty), our case study analyzes the role of accounting technology in 
control at a distance in the pharmaceutical industry by means of an analysis of sales force 
performance measurement in eleven pharmaceutical laboratories. In the Appendix 1, a 
summary table of the laboratories studied provides some information to position these 
laboratories in relation to each other. 
Between March and December 2003, we conducted thirty-six semi-directive interviews in 
France
9. Thirty interviews were conducted with people working in one of the eleven 
pharmaceutical laboratories, more precisely twenty-six members of a sales force, four 
members of functions involved in the control of sales forces at a distance (marketing function, 
management control, sales administration) (see Table 1 below
10). Furthermore, six interviews 
were conducted with individuals who work in bodies external to the laboratories and who are 
potentially involved in the measurement of performance of the laboratories’ sales forces:   
pharmacy, Human Resources consulting firms, and technology service providers for the 
pharmaceutical industry) (see Table 2 below). The aim of these six interviews was to go 
beyond the limits of the organisation (the laboratory) in order to deepen our understanding of 
the socio-institutional aspects of control at a distance. 
 
                                                 
9 The conditions for conducting the interviews were the following: average duration of 1 hour 30 minutes, 
recorded on tape. Out of the 36 interviews conducted, eight were carried out by telephone and 28 face-to-face. 
10 Our obligation to respect the interviewees’ anonymity notwithstanding, we don’t give the name of the 
laboratory they are working for. 






Function of the Interviewee  Area of Activity 
Abbreviation Used 
for the Interview 
Extracts 
A 
Sales  Regional Manager of Neuro-Geriatrics 
Network  A1 (RM) 
   Sales  Drug Representative 
Specialists (community or 
hospital independents)  A2 (DR) 
B  
Sales 
Regional Manager Internal Medicine 
Community (GPs
11 and 
Specialists)  B1 (RM) 




Community (GPs and 
Specialists) B3  (DR) 
D   Sales  Regional Manager Anaemia  Hospital  D1 (RM) 
  Sales  Regional Manager Anaemia  Hospital  D2 (RM) 
   Sales  Drug Representative Hospital Anaemia  Hospital  D3 (DR) 
   Sales  Drug Representative Hospital Anaemia  Hospital  D4 (DR) 




Community (GPs and 
Respirologists) F2  (DR) 
L  Sales  Zone Manager Immunology Network East  Hospital  L1 (ZM) 






Function of the Interviewee  Area of Activity 
Abbreviation Used 
for the Interview 
Extracts 
S  Sales  Regional Manager (BU Cardiology)  Hospital  S1 (RM) 
   Sales  Regional Manager (BU Cardiology)  Community  S2 (RM) 
   Sales  Hospital Drug Representative  Hospital  S3 (DR) 
   Sales  Drug Representative  Community  S4 (DR) 




Director of Administration of Drug 
Representation   Non-applicable  T1 (SAD) 
  
Sales 
Administration Director of Operational IT Systems   Non-applicable  T2  (SAD) 
W 
Management 
control  Management Controller  Non-applicable  W1 (MC) 
  
Sales  Drug Representation Manager, Northern 
France Community  W2  (DRM) 
   Sales  Network Manager North Paris  Community  W3 (NM) 
  Sales  Regional Manager  Community  W4 (RM) 
  Sales  Drug Representative  Community  W5 (DR) 
 
Sales Drug  Representative 




Specialists (community or 




Specialists (community or 
hospital independents)  Z2 (DR) 
   Sales  Drug Representative  Community  Z3 (DR) 
EF  Sales  Regional Manager  Community  EF (RM Provider) 
Table 1 Information about the thirty interviewees working in pharmaceutical laboratories 
 
                                                 
11 GP: General Practitioner (médecin généraliste in French) 




Function of the Interviewee 
Abbreviation used 
for the Interview 
Extracts 
H  Consulting  Consultant   H1 (CONSULT) 
   Consulting  Consultant   H2 (CONSULT) 
IH 
Service 












PHARMA  Drug Sales   Pharmacist (Owner)  PHARMA 
Table 2 Information about the six interviewees working outside pharmaceutical laboratories and involved 
in control at a distance of laboratories’ sales forces 
 
The data gathered over the course of the 36 interviews were supplemented with the analysis of 
secondary data provided by interviewees: grading tables, examples of reporting requested by 
the reporting line, tables of sales statistics received by drug representatives.  
 
According to certain scholars, socio-institutional research neglects the “voice of labour” 
(Ezzamel et al., 2004b, p.299). For instance, the analysis of Miller and O’Leary (1994b) 
regarding the technological changes in a Caterpillar factory implicitly presupposes the passive 
acceptance, even the cooperation, of the employees. Yet it is relevant to study how the 
organisation (notably, it’s production activity) is “contingent upon workers’ willingness to 
behave in particular ways, and their perceptions of the relevance of new manufacturing 
techniques and accounting techniques for defending the social spaces” they occupy (Ezzamel 
et al., 2004b, p.300). In our research, we have therefore attempted to account for the “micro” 
level. The preponderance of dyads n+1/n (with n being a non-manager) in our interview 
samples is one way of preserving this “voice of labour”. Phenomena of resistance and 
cynicism have been underlined in the interviewees’ discourse. Their participation (more or 
less conscious) in the development of control technologies has also been highlighted.  
More broadly, our analysis consisted in finding problems in controlling sales forces at a 
distance and in identifying the technologies available to laboratories or used by them to 
measure sales force performance. We also set about qualifying the role played by these 
technologies in the management of control at a distance. To this end, we have used predefined 
codes, linked to our initial assumptions, such as the articulation between discourse and 
calculation. Other codes emerged in the course of our analysis, with translation theory proving 
to be a relevant analytical framework. The analysis actually relies on Latour’s three qualities 
of inscriptions produced by technology that allow translation (mobility, stability and 
combinability) as an analytical device to understand the role of technology in control at a 
distance.   
 
3.  The ‘true nature of control’ at a distance through 
technology 
 
Our analysis shows that technologies of control at a distance lead to an illusion of external 
control. Control at a distance does not consist in linking established calculations to a place 
with actions performed in another place; this link being indeed weak (3.1). However, control 
at a distance is a matter of keeping this link blurred and inducing the conviction that this link 
  12is clear using technologies. Control at a distance is enabled by the substitution of resources, 
the codification and the integration that technologies exert, combined with two ideals imputed 
on technology (permanent surveillance and truth through quantification) (3.2). These features 
lead individuals to develop self-control, which is the ‘true nature’ and aim of control at a 
distance (3.3). Therefore, the illusion of external control enabled by technology is 
compensated by the growing self-control of individuals. 
3.1. Technologies of performance measurement and the illusion of control that they 
entail 
 
Technologies of sales force performance measurement in the pharmaceutical industry 
In the sector of the pharmaceutical industry, there are numerous technologies of performance 
measurement made available by information centres. These technologies are commercialised 
to pharmaceutical laboratories by external providers that are equivalent to the service agencies 
described by Clegg. These agencies are specialised in the sale of disciplinary technologies on 
a consultative, subcontracting or advisory basis (Clegg, 1998, p.39). In the pharmaceutical 
industry, three main technologies gather, consolidate and provide data on the performances of 
sales forces to pharmaceutical laboratories: the ETMS (Electronic Territory Management 
Systems); the GERS (Groupement pour l’Elaboration et la Réalisation de Statistiques), 
unique to French; and panel analyses proposed by two main firms, IMS Health and Cegedim. 
 
With regard to the problems of control at a distance, technologies are implemented that are 
supposed to resolve these problems, meaning that they should enable a coherent articulation 
between calculations and discourses for measuring the performance of sales forces. There is a 
common illusion that technology resolves problems of control and this illusion is conveyed by 
consultant remuneration specialists.  
H2 (CONSULT): Pharmacy is a particular profession. It is very difficult to set a sales target 
for a drug representative because he does not sell. However, the pharmaceutical sector has 
been working a lot on this. There is a very direct correlation between the number of visits 
that you make and the sales figures that we will find in pharmacies. So they fall back, if you 
like, not on the sales targets required of a drug rep because that isn’t possible, but instead on 
a number of visits, his attendance at conferences and other events which is supposed to 
generate, mathematically and statistically, a sales figure. The pharmaceutical sector has very 
powerful tools at its disposal. It is a particularly advanced sector in the area of measuring 
sales representatives’ performances because they can rely on statistical and analytical tools 
that are extremely cutting-edge. 
The control technologies are presented as infallible by their users, especially when they are 
the designers of these technologies or people in sales administration. For instance, in the 
interview T1 simply cannot understand our question regarding any potential flaws in the tools 
that he has developed throughout his career in sales administration at T. When we refine our 
question by asking for possible examples of misuse of these tools or erroneous statements 
input into them, he answers that this is impossible.  
T1 (SAD): No. In the tools there is little opportunity because everything is locked down. 
There are ceilings everywhere; it is impossible to input things that are not in the norms.  
However, his job partly consists in carrying out controls of coherence between the real 
activity of the DRs and the statements they input into the technologies.  
 
The ETMS: a technology supposed to strengthen the link between a DR visit and a medical 
prescription  
  13In the pharmaceutical industry, the ETMS are equivalent to Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) tools. “Teams”, developed by TVF (a firm in the Cegedim Group), is the 
main ETMS used by the pharmaceutical laboratories studied
12. It enables a computerised 
management of the DR visit. Notably, it includes an electronic diary, an electronic message 
system, a clientele manager, and an activity manager. Like all ETMS, Teams constitutes both 
a work support for the drug representative and a control support of the regional manager. Its 
data (coming from Head Office, provider firms, and statements made by each member of the 
sales force on his activity) feeds both the spreadsheet that is essential to the DR and a 
reporting of his activity for the managers. The activity statement in the ETMS forms the basis 
of performance monitoring of the DR’s activity by his reporting line with regard to 
compliance with his targeting and frequency of visits.  
T2 (SAD): In relation to the strategic targeting that is defined, the regional director has a 
very accurate view of the coverage and the frequency of contacts, which are the two key 
indicators that we find in the activity. He sees, in the ETMS and using a complementary 
analysis tool, all the doctors who have been targeted, those who have been seen, how many 
times and how much pressure each drug rep puts on his targets. He sees if the drug rep has 
covered his whole target well and the number of visits. [...] We have key indicators, 
published each month, that have been defined by the senior management and ourselves. 
Whatever your level, you have the same indicators. [...] It’s the rate of fieldwork, the target 
coverage, the number of visits. The number of off-target contacts too. It’s a key indicator 
that we consult; it should normally be at zero.  
In the Appendix 2, the reconstructed structure of an activity reporting in the ETMS can be 
found, based on statements made by Z2 (DR) and demonstrations made live in the course of 
the interview. This reporting concretely illustrates the types of information contained in the 
ETMS
13. It also shows that ETMS technology deploys a strong visual control that relies on 
signals and specific colour codes. For instance, when a drug representative declares fewer 
than four visits a day, this day appears in red, which then alerts the regional manager to go 
and analyse the activity of the drug representative.  
 
The regional managers use the ETMS in part for this purpose of external control in order to 
measure the drug representative’s compliance with norms of activity.  
L1 (RM): Today, there is precise targeting and a management policy of 100% coverage of 
the target, which is entirely legitimate. And, especially that there should be a high numbers 
of visits to those practitioners who produce our sales figure. [...] What I mean by activity is 
the number of contacts that they go and see. It’s true that if I have a drug rep who only goes 
to see interns, doctors in training, it doesn’t suit me. [...] I measure these using Teams [using 
specific requests:] the average number of contacts, but also, I would add, the quality. How 
many targeted specialities does [the drug rep] have compared to his overall activity? Is he 
going to the right establishments?  
Such use of the ETMS is based on the assumption that a direct link exists between the number 
of contacts or compliance with the targeting by the drug representative and prescriptions by 
doctors. Nothing in the ETMS enables this link to be proved, let alone quantified. This link is 
                                                 
12 The Cegedim Group enjoys around 80% of the market share in France with its TEAMS offering and asserts 
that TEAMS is Europe’s most-used software platform and service in the fields of management, information and 
sales force activities (Cegedim Annual Report, 2003). Rival ETMS are used in some laboratories: Siebel and 
Agoris (developed by Dendrite). 
13 Information on the doctors (name, address, speciality, prescription potential, etc.) but also on the declared 
activity of the drug representatives: number of doctors seen daily per speciality and per prescription potential, 
number of pharmacists visited, and number of professional relationships organised.  
  14indirect and assumed. Technologies such as the ETMS, with their activity reporting, thus 
allow control to be established based solely on variables assumed to correspond to a goal.  
The same can be said of Professional Relationships. The ETMS obliges the drug 
representative to report his Professional Relationship activities with doctors but does not 
enable the impact of these PRs on the medical prescription to be measured.  
Moreover, the technology of ETMS is based on a second hypothesis whereby there is an exact 
correspondence between the activities of the drug representative and what declarations he 
makes using the technology.  
 
The GERS: a technology supposed to resolve the flawed control of the drug representation – 
laboratory’s turnover chain.  
In France, the Groupement pour l’Elaboration et la Réalisation de Statistiques (GERS) was 
created in 1974 by and for the pharmaceutical industry to publish sales statistics. The data are 
not gathered from panels, but are real figures collected from wholesalers and laboratories. 
They reflect wholesale deliveries and direct sales from laboratories to pharmacies
14. All 
pharmaceutical laboratories use data from the GERS in order to know their turnover per 
product, their market shares, or those of competitor products on a weekly or monthly basis. 
The GERS is accessible to all members of the laboratory’s sales force in raw data form or in a 
summary format generated by systems specific to the laboratories
15.  
 
Below, we observe the link that is made by the drug representative between the sales results 
given by the GERS and his activity in terms of visits (the underlying assumption is that it is 
by visiting doctors that the laboratory’s turnover will improve, and that it is the sales statistic 
technology covering pharmacy orders that enables individual activity and regional 
performance to be correlated).  
 
I: Do you use [weekly data from GERS] a lot? 
B3 (DR): Yes. I use it every week. What I look at is my sector’s market share over the week. 
I look at the UGAs to see if any have dropped. [...] If I see, for example, that the doctors in 
Giens have let me down, I head over to Giens.  
In reality, the GERS provides a vision of the turnover achieved per UGA
16. Increasingly, the 
big laboratories have several drug representatives (in threes) working on the same UGA in 
order to intensify the pressure of drug representation in a sector. This raises the issue of 
measuring the individual performance of the drug representatives. In addition, the GERS does 
not allow the link that exists between the activity of the three representatives and the 
pharmacies’ turnovers in their UGA to be either confirmed or analysed.  
 
Equally, the GERS statistics (or, below, the corresponding expert – the wholesale distributor) 
are sometimes presented as the technology that enables the activity of drug representation in a 
zone and the medical prescription of potentially another zone to be geographically correlated: 
 
I: How can you know that it is your zone that was the source of the prescription?  
B3 (DR): Well … That should be the GERS … Anyways, my wholesaler is in Orleans. He 
must know that. Because, in fact, they are orders from pharmacies. My wholesaler knows 
                                                 
14 Source: www.gie-gers.fr 
15 Recently, the GERS has started to provide laboratories with sales figures on a weekly basis. It is in response to 
the laboratories’ need for responsiveness, since this service enables the activity of the drug representatives to be 
rapidly adapted, notably during product launch phases. 
16 UGA: unité de gestion administrative. Designates a geographical zone as a reference in the geographical 
breakdown of France performed by the GERS that provides the pharmaceutical laboratories with the data for 
drug sales. 
  15which pharmacies have ordered.  
 
However, the GERS does not enable this. This is one of the criticisms levelled at the GERS 
within the laboratories.  
M1 (MKT): The GERS gives wholesaler sales to pharmacies. They will say that we have 
sold 200 boxes of C to a given pharmacy. The problem is that it is quite likely that the doctor 
who prescribed C is in another UGA than the pharmacy that ordered C, especially in the 
Greater Paris region. All the drug reps complain about this bias.  
 
Geographical panels: a technology supposed to resolve the flawed control of the drug 
representation – laboratory net turnover chain. 
XPonent is a tool created in 1999 by IMS, the leading provider of medical data worldwide. 
From a panel of 47% of all French pharmacies (10,200 out of the 22,000 pharmacies in 
France), it performs an extrapolation in order to provide its clients with a detailed account of 
prescriptions issued by a group of doctors (a minimum of five anonymous doctors per group). 
Xponent is less powerful that the GERS insofar as the data are not exhaustive, but it has the 
advantage of informing the laboratories about real pharmacy sales (contrary to the GERS that 
informs about pharmacy orders). Moreover, compared to the GERS, XPonent centralises the 
sales figures by medical speciality. Out of a number of boxes sold in pharmacies, this tools 
enables laboratories to know which percentage of boxes were prescribed by community 
doctors, for each medical speciality, and which percentage of boxes come from prescriptions 
written in hospital. It is therefore of particular interest to laboratories’ hospital networks 
because it is the only tool enabling the source effect
17 to be partly measured. For laboratories 
that possess a hospital network and that can afford to purchase these statistics, Xponent is 
often considered a information base that complements the GERS.  
Other information centres rely on a panel rationale that targets doctors rather than pharmacies. 
For instance, ICOMED, the Institut de la Communication Médicale implanted in France in 
1985 by the Cegedim group, measures doctors’ preferences for prescribed products by 
sending them a speciality-specific self-administered questionnaire.  
 
XPonent is presented by the managing director of the firm that designed it as a technology 
enabling an insight into DR performance that is more real than that given by the GERS 
because it measures laboratory turnovers using pharmacy sales rather than their orders.  
IH (MDP): In the GERS, the representative’s performance is what the pharmacists order. We 
say that this is not the most accurate way of measuring a representative’s performance. We 
have therefore opted for a different methodology that captures the information at the 
pharmacy outcome, meaning the purchasing act of the patient. For the first time, we are able 
to say for real: “the drug representative’s real performance are the products prescribed by the 
doctors he has visited and that have also subsequently been bought at the pharmacy.”  
T2 (SAD): For the activity of hospital representation, we use XPonent because we cannot get 
the information any other way. [...]  
I: You use XPonent even though it is a panel?  
T2 (SAD): Yes. Given the number of pharmacies, if you will, 10,500 pharmacies out of 
22,000 pharmacies, it is more than a panel. In terms of extrapolation, it’s… at least as 
reliable as the GERS. 
 
                                                 
17 The source effect pertains to the influence of hospital doctors on the prescription made in community medicine 
and on drug purchases made in the community. XPonent informs on this second influence (prescription in 
hospital, purchase in the community).  
  16If XPonent effectively provides laboratories with new insight into the type of sale achieved by 
differentiating medical specialities, it leaves several problems of linking discourse and 
calculation unresolved. It measures pharmacy sales but still leaves laboratories in the dark 
about the link between drug representation and pharmacy sales. In fact, this technology does 
not measure the representative’s “real performance” but rather that of the pharmacy. 
Moreover, beyond the fact that XPonent does not provide exhaustive sales figures, but only 
those from a panel, Xponent does not measure the performance of hospital networks correctly, 
as mentioned below:  
 
S3 (DR): [XPonent] is another problem.  
I: How is it problematic?  
S3 (DR): It is also a tool for assessing the performance of the hospital rep. It differentiates 
prescriptions coming from hospitals from independent practices. But private clinics are 
independent. So, the prescriptions they write are classed as independent. Moreover, we have 
special hospitals here in Lorraine that are private and non-for-profit. They are an 
intermediary between the private and public sectors. For them, it’s the same. The 
prescriptions that come out are coded “community healthcare” by XPonent. And when you 
have three quarters of your hospitals that are either clinics or these public-private hospitals, 
you get the regional manager of community jumping for joy, shouting, “Community is up, 
community is up!” And you find yourself with a bad X-Ponent. There you go.  
 
The managing director of TT, a rival to the firm that developed XPonent, highlights other 
weaknesses of the tool:  
TT (MDP): [On their panel’s pharmacies], they are not exhaustive on prescriptions. They 
only have prescriptions immediately reimbursed by public health insurance, meaning those 
recorded on the pharmacy’s IT system. So it isn’t a true solution. XPonent provides very 
good data for analysis, but it isn’t very good data for management. 
Technologies supposed to resolve the flawed control of the link between promotional 
investment and medical prescription.  
A number of technologies are designed to measure the return on investment of promotional 
operations. This return on investment is measured in terms of medical prescriptions. Among 
these technologies may be cited Strategy Evaluator (IMS Health) and the product proposed by 
CAM (Cegedim). Strategy Evaluator (IMS Health) analyses medical prescriptions from 
cohorts of doctors, meaning groups of dispersed doctors who share one or several specific 
criteria (for example, having attended a specific professional relationship, a conference, or 
taken part in a phase IV study). CAM is the leader in the creation of promotional investment 
databases for the pharmaceutical industry. CAM audits the performance of all media used by 
pharmaceutical laboratories’ marketing teams. It collects data on pharmaceutical products and 
practitioners’ actions through panels of doctors in general and specialized practices and 
pharmacists
18.  
Even though these technologies help to identify medical prescriptions from certain types of 
doctors more accurately, they all rely on panels and consequently on extrapolations. More 
fundamentally, these technologies are based on practitioners’ perceptions of their 
prescriptions or their memory of a past conference. They therefore raise the issue of the 
reliability of the data gathered.  
 
                                                 
18 CAM is the sole reference for the world’s top fifty laboratories for the annual systematic monitoring of 
pharmaceutical laboratories’ promotional expenses. Its panels of doctors cover over 100,000 general 
practitioners worldwide (Cegedim Annual Report, 2003) 
  17CAM is a technology that is sometimes diverted from its initial purpose. Indeed, it is used in 
some laboratories to detect potential problems of disparities between the representative’s 
statements and the representative’s real activity. Once again, the use of this technology feeds 
an illusion of control as we can see below.  
 
To a question of how important the statement is in the drug representatives’ reporting on their 
activity in the ETMS, W2 launches into an argument that spotlights all the technologies used 
to solve what is, in his opinion, a bogus problem.  
W2 (DRM): Everything is not based on the statement; if that were the case, it would pose a 
problem for me. There are a certain number of tools at our disposal [...]. For example, we do 
recalls [telephone surveys of doctors]. [...] Through the statement of the number of contacts 
in a day, we tell the rep that he must do six contacts a day, he says that he has seen six. But 
there is what we call a bogus visit. Let’s say that he has only seen five, and that he barely 
shook the hand of the fourth. To deal with this, there is communication. There is a body 
called CAM that gives me the true returns. [...] It’s a body that works for the pharmaceutical 
industry, which does market studies. When, internally, I press the button and I see that I’ve 
produced 10,000 visits, the CAM tells me that, over the same period, it only accounts for 
8,000, so 2,000 are missing. All that to say that there is a limit to the statement. We cannot 
believe it. There are, in the end, very few statements made. There is certainly some at the 
individual level, but on the global level, they are already no longer given. It is all very 
“screened”. We do market studies immediately afterwards [...] each time, I have a parade, at 
least of all the key parameters, which I follow monthly. It is not making statements, it is 
controlled statements crossed with x data.  
We are at the heart of the technological ideal. Technologies correct, bring out the truth, and do 
so in an instantaneous way. In reality, the link between discourse and calculation that the 
technologies construct remains inconsistent. Indeed, we feel the whole illusion of the system 
when W2 explains that the aggregation generated by the technologies enables him to render 
the errors that may exist at the individual level insignificant, as if they were erased! 
Furthermore, the technologies mentioned by W2 replace the statement made by the 
representative with the statement made by the doctor, which is not a solution, as TT reminds 
us below:  
TT (MDP): we cannot put a policeman behind each representative. We therefore call on 
firms that provide recall tests. But it isn’t more objective than the representative’s statement 
since it involves the doctor’s memory… We are still dealing with the human element. So, we 
mustn’t abuse this. If you have a variance in Teams, it’s usual; if you have a 25% disparity, 
then ok, that’s a real signal. Once again, the problem is not with the data but with how to 
analyse these data.  
 
  18The table below provides a summary of the illusions and realities regarding the capacities of 
the pharmaceutical industry’s performance measuring technologies. 
 
Technology  The Problem of control 
at a distance supposedly 
resolved 
Service provided by the 
technology 
Weaknesses and problems of the 
technology 
CAM (Cegedim)  Link between promotional 
investments and medical 
prescriptions  
 
Link between activity 
statement and real activity 
of the DR  
Measurement of return on 
investment for 
promotional operations 
and other actions 
Non-exhaustiveness of data (panels) 
High entry cost for laboratories with 
large sales force 




Link between drug 
representation and medical 
prescription 
Measurement of DR 
compliance with norms of 
activity, targeting, number 
of contacts 
Based on the statement (problem of 
bogus visits) 
GERS  Link between the drug 
representation and 
turnover 
Gives the sales and market 
share per product and per 
geographical zone on the 
basis of pharmacy orders 
from the wholesaler-
distributors (monthly or 
weekly frequency) 
Measurement of the performance of 
regions biased by the non-accounting for 
geographical source of prescriptions. 
Phenomenon of drug stocking by 
pharmacies non-identified (potential 
problem at end of business cycle, during 
the calculation of bonuses to the sales 
force) 
A full month of delay in transmitting data 
(data for September received at the 
beginning of November) 
High cost of the latest improvements 




Link between drug 
representation and 
turnover 
Statistics from pharmacy 
outcomes through group 
analysis of prescriptions 
leading to a purchase 
Problems: 
Non- exhaustiveness of data (panel of 
pharmacy and no exhaustiveness of 
prescriptions in these pharmacies) 
Diversity of types of establishment 
unaccounted for 
High cost and geographical panel 
(requires the attainment of a critical mass 
in numbers of prescribers)  
 
Table 3 Service provided by the performance measurement technologies in the pharmaceutical industry 
 
The problems of control at a distance encountered by pharmaceutical laboratories all seem to 
be resolved, in the discourses of the people interviewed, by technologies. The diagram below 
summarises the problems of control at a distance previously shown (see Figure 1) and brings 
to light what the technological “solutions” mentioned by the interviewees actually relate to in 
reality. 
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Figure 2 The illusory technological solutions for the problems of control at a distance in measuring the 
performance of sales forces in the pharmaceutical industry 
 
Above and beyond the intrinsic problems of the technologies mentioned in Table 3, it is 
noteworthy that most of these technologies (except the CAM) bring to light quantified 
information on behavioural elements or discourses, but that they do not conduct an analysis of 
the arrows, meaning understanding the links between discourses, behaviours and calculations. 
For instance, although XPonent is in effect closer to the reality of sales than the GERS by 
focusing on pharmacies’ products sold rather that products ordered, it does not provide a new 
answer to explain the link between the drug representative’s visit, the doctor’s prescription 
and the patient’s purchase.  
 
In the end, the technologies do not solve the problems of control at a distance of sales forces 
in the pharmaceutical industry. They provide their users with a feeling of control that proves 
to be unfounded. In particular, the technologies signal good and bad performances but do not 
give the cause. In the event of bad performances, they serve to justify ex post control – a 
sanction.  
 
D1 (RM): Currently, I have the case of a drug representative who was working well, who 
had good results in the second quarter, who is autonomous, very good, etc. All of a sudden, 
she has poorer results. I look at the analysis. There are always external elements, you know, 
it’s always the fault of something else. It’s often true but there also has to be some questions 
raised. It’s not always easy to put your finger on it, on the reps. In this sense, the figures are 
then a good means of making a decision. They are quite difficult to argue with.  
I: But they don’t give you the cause of the underperformance…  
D1 (RM): No, that’s true, it doesn’t give the cause but it gives an opportunity and a 
legitimacy to go and look for it… with the representative. I look at the figures and I see that 
things are not going well for this representative. So I turn to her and say: “What have you 
been doing? Do you think enough has been done?” The figures remain a good indication of 
someone’s performance in the medium and long term. But it is clear that is not enough. 
  20Anyways, the figures are nonetheless what sanctions.  
 
In the example above, the technology of the GERS indicates a drop in turnover for the 
geographical zone of a representative. This triggers a series of controls of this representative’s 
activity data in another technology (the ETMS). However, the ETMS will not give the cause 
of the underperformance because the link between the drug representative’s visit and the 
turnover is too tenuous. In contrast, the combined use of the GERS and ETMS technologies 
enables the reporting line to justify the ex-post control. The data they provide will serve the 
neutrality and the objectivity of any future sanction. The apparent reduction of ambiguities, by 
the translation of qualities into quantities, is one of the main appeals of quantification. “Whilst 
assertions that quantification leads to more precise, objective and rigorous knowledge have 
undoubtedly served to legitimate the emphasis upon numbers, such arguments are difficult to 
sustain. In contrast, it is suggested that while accounting ‘knowledge’ may not ‘correspond’ to 
any remote context in terms of truth, this failure of reference may involve reformulating the 
problem of truth into a problem of power and distance.” (Robson, 1992, p.704). 
 
We have just seen how technologies resolve the problems of control at a distance only 
artificially. However, the articulation that they offer between tekne and logos appears rational 
and legitimate in the words of the interviewees. As a result, technologies do take part in the 
process of translation, in the internalisation of constraints by the actors of the pharmaceutical 
laboratories who are controlled at a distance. How can it be that these technologies take part 
in this control at a distance when, in fact, we are unable to justify the sound founding of the 
articulation that they provide between the calculations and the discourses that underpin them? 
3.2. Why do technologies enable control at a distance?  
 
The performance measurement technologies that we have studied enable control at a distance 
because they take full part in the process of translating mobile, stable and combinable 
information. These three qualities mentioned by Latour relate to the data diffused by the 
technologies rather than the technologies themselves. We will see below how technologies act 
on these three qualities. Moreover, our study shows that performance measurement 
technologies are underpinned by two ideals that strengthen their potential for control at a 
distance: an ideal of permanent surveillance and an ideal of truth through quantification.  
 
“What is mine is not yours”: mobility through technological substitution  
Technologies of control at a distance are supposed to make mobile the objects that one seeks 
to control at a distance to allow them to come closer together (Latour, 1989, p.534). How does 
this quality translate with regard to measurement technologies of sales performance in the 
pharmaceutical industry? Performance measurement technologies make mobile individuals’ 
resources relevant by substituting exclusive ownership of these resources. Thus, centralisation 
and archiving of the sales activity in the ETMS is part of redistributing of control from the 
drug representatives to the pharmaceutical laboratories. Through technology, the laboratory 
hedges risk and reduces the comparative advantage held by the individual by sharing with 
everyone what constitutes the fundamental asset of the sales representative: the address book.  
B3 (DR): As soon as I have a meeting, I put it into the computer, even if it isn’t for some 
time to come. In the past, when people left the laboratory, they left with their contacts! Now 
they say, “no, the contacts are not yours but the laboratory’s!”  
Here we find one of the features of technologies in surveillance societies highlighted by Lyon: 
databases entail “dissolution of the owner”. The content of the database is everyone’s and no 
  21one’s; at the same time, the database has been acquired by an institution and, as such, belongs 
to it (Lyon, 2001, p.115). In this respect, technologies of control at a distance enable the 
creation of a mobility that is permanent: “Writing provides the opportunity to inspect and re-
inspect the inscribed elements by being ‘out-of-time’; unlike the receipt of oral information, it 
is mobile in a temporal sense also” (Robson, 1992, p.693). 
 
“It is written in stone”: stability through codification 
The capacity of accounting inscriptions to enhance mechanisms of long-distance control is 
contingent upon their stability of form (Robson, 1992, p.695). In our case study, this stability 
of performance data is based on data codification and archiving by the performance 
measurement technologies. In this way the technologies enable performance data to be 
handled while avoiding their distortion by users.  
As is stated below, the predefined frameworks for reporting activity in the ETMS and the 
principle of electronic validation that governs them does not allow for the eventuality of 
correction.  
A1 (RM): You can also, with this IT system, enter a bogus visit with wanting to. I’ve typed 
in the name of a doctor and I enter the validation too quickly, oh no! Yes, but it is in the 
system. Since the policy is not to get a single visit report modified by the site administrators, 
once something is done and validated, it’s over. So, if you make a mistake, you correct it by 
sending a mail in which you mention in the next visit report that you made a mistake: “I 
didn’t see that particular doctor”.  
If the data transmitted by the technologies contain errors, it is for the relevant user to correct 
them by ad hoc messages, but the incorrect data will never be modified.  
 
Performance measurement technologies reinforce the stability of the data transmitted by the 
drug representatives by creating databases that cannot be modified and are shared by the 
whole sales force. In the quotation below, the targeting proposed by each representative is 
integrated into the Intranet and becomes the normative reference that steers the 
representative’s activity and, in part, determines his assessment. 
Z2 (DR): we are constantly judged by our coverage of the target. […] Each year, we do a top 
50, we define a top 50 goal. You choose 50 doctors who seem important to you in your 
targeting [...] we have a deadline to send it. It is set, recorded in Excel and send to the 
manager. Then, this top 50 is on the Intranet and it is accessible to all representatives to 
consult. And so, for each doctor in the top 50, we see the number of visits that I have set, 
how many I have done to date and so my percentage for far in relation to the goal. […] This 
top 50 constitutes an important point on which I will be assessed during my annual appraisal. 
It reflects the coverage of the target.  
The economic norms put in place through the technologies of control at a distance remain in 
place and constitute a reference (Miller, 1994, p.2). Technologies enable norms and 
references to be developed that steer the behaviour of the individual. They have value as 
objective reference points. As Sfez reminds us, “the calculation rules everything. The science 
of numbers is a sort of universal tool. Harmonious proportions and justice then follow” (Sfez, 
2002, p.165). 
 
Stability is not only enacted through the inflexibility of the technology but also through its 
capacity to make information recognisable and comparable to their users (Robson, 1992, 
p.695). The performance measurement technologies we have studied enable this aspect of 
stability to be achieved through codification. This codification is based on a synthesis and 
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the levers on which he may or must act.  
F2 (DR): I have the GERS every week, [...] each week I look at the trends. You have the 
average for France, the regional average and goal attainment. If you are rising and above the 
French average, you’re in green. If you are above the French average, but falling, you’re in 
orange. If you are below the French average and you are also falling, you are in red.  
Whether the codes stem from turnover measurement technology (the GERS) or activity 
measurement technology (the ETMS), the codes simplify the real and are seen by the 
interviewees as control supports (control by oneself in the previous quotation, control by the 
manager in the following quotation).  
Z2 (DR): That day for example, I only did three visits. My RM should go and see why. She 
will see in fact that it was a day of mixed activity because I did training on that day. When 
you do fewer than four visits, the system automatically colours the day in red.  
Codification implies formalisation, schematisation, uniformisation, the possibility for 
archiving, and systematicity. This enables data analysis and the assessment and correction of 
the individual on the basis of this analysis. The codification performed by accounting 
technologies plays a role, as such, in governing the individual. Through the act of inscribing, 
events are transformed and submitted for examination (Hoskin & Macve, 1994, p.67-68). 
 
“Unity is power”: combinability through technological integration  
Technologies of control at a distance must enable the control objects to be combined so that 
they may be cumulated and shuffled like a deck of cards whatever the manner in which they 
are constituted (Latour, 1989). In our study, this combinability is enabled by integrating 
diverse performance measurement technologies. Integrating technologies must allow the 
performance of the drug representative to be objectified. Multiple performance data are 
combined to deduce new, synthesised and aggregated data that determine performance 
remuneration. The drug representatives are aware of these combinations that determine the 
bonuses they will receive without fully understanding the finer details as the following 
quotation shows: 
A2 (DR): Calculating the bonus is often complicated, however. There are times when you 
don’t understand. It is especially in community healthcare that it is really sensitive. […] For 
example, there is one aspect that is on the rise… It is the average rise in patients over a 28-
day period. Then, there’s the increase in the competitor’s anti-cholesterol drugs at sector 
level. I don’t know what they do afterwards. They mix it up, all together. And we have so 
much to do. 
Calculating bonuses perfectly illustrates the emergence of new categories from the 
combination of multiple performance data provided by the various technologies. “Rather than 
assert that there is some consistent ‘essence’ denying the addition of things that are different, 
we can acknowledge that numbers can be implicated in the creation of new categories of 
‘object’ or ‘entity’ that arise from the play of mathematical transformations. […] Once 
different inscriptions are combined, they create a new tier of inscriptions that can stand for 
and replace the previous inscriptions” (Robson 1992, p.698, 699). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on the potential to integrate technologies to 
conduct a control of coherence with regard to data declared by the sales force (budget spent 
on promotional operations, number of visits declared, etc.). 
SAD 1: Today, we are increasingly linking the tools together through other tools. For 
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the level of administrating representatives’ visits, it allows us to check that all the expenses 
do indeed relate to a professional activity.  
In this search for combinability, it may occur that performance measurement technologies are 
diverted from their initial purpose (as we saw in the example of the CAM). For instance, 
when a pharmaceutical laboratory seeks to spot bogus visits, it crosses data output by 
technologies that are not a priori designed to provide information on the coherence of a drug 
representative’s statements. Activity reporting provided by the representative in the ETMS as 
well as his statements of transport mileage are crossed with the findings of CAM surveys of 
panels of doctors regarding their memory of a promotional operation or of a message 
delivered during a visit from a representative.  
TT (MDP): In our group, we try to set up indicators to try to differentiate the effectiveness of 
the networks, if not individuals. To do this, we cross-reference activity data output by Teams 
and data output by CAM that give the impact on the doctor (does he remember the visit, the 
message?). CAM enables us to find the doctor, the date of the visit; if we cross-reference this 
with Teams, we could logically find the representative who made the visit. Today, cross-
referencing information is what most laboratories are looking for. […] For analysis, [the 
RM] is constantly required to link the tools: I look at my results (in the GERS), “I’m going 
to find the explanations” (in Teams).   
In this sense, performance measurement technologies combine data non only to objectify the 
performance of sales forces but also to exert a control of coherence over the sales force’s 
statements. “Combinability allows the actor to accumulate inscriptions, aggregate them, 
tabulate them, recombine them in order to establish new relationships, and calculate ‘norms’” 
(Robson, 1992, p.697). “Translation involves creating convergences and homologies by 
relating things that were previously different” (Callon, 1980, p.211). It is indeed a matter of 
producing new relationships because, fundamentally, the technologies mentioned (ETMS and 
CAM) are not designed to conduct investigations into bogus visits. This rise in visibility that 
is enabled by combining several performance data invites us to decipher the ideals that 
underpin technologies of control at a distance above and beyond their role in creating mobile, 
stable and combinable data. The technologies integrate to form a global surveillance device.  
 
“Big brother is watching you” or the ideal of permanent surveillance 
Technologies of control at a distance are based on an ideal of permanent surveillance. In this 
respect, the RM’s management of closeness (visits to doctors in twos with drug 
representatives, for example) usefully complements all the instrumentation of control at a 
distance.   
W2 (DRM): I’ve already talked with people working in the agri-food business and they are 
astounded by the number of tools we have available. Today, there are enormous numbers of 
firms revolving around the pharmaceutical industry that bring us help in this aspect. I have 
the national data. It’s sure that, seen from my office, I could be told any old thing. Locally, 
it’s the work of the RM. It’s pragmatic work, but it has value as coaching. It’s the value of 
closeness. It’s like the forensic police, if you will, and the local police force; it’s not the 
same world. You may say that there are statements made, but there’s a time when it is 
nonetheless relational. Have I reassured you?  
W2 is sure of the rationality of control at a distance because an ideal precedes the link 
between discourse and calculation carried out by technologies. In the comments above, the 
ideal is that of permanent surveillance (the “police”). From this ideal, it is always possible to 
create an artificial link between the discourses and calculations contained in the technologies.  
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Technologies of control at a distance, through this ideal of permanent surveillance, redefine 
Bentham’s panopticon referred to by Foucault in Surveiller et Punir (1975)
19. The visual 
control of the panopticon becomes control at a distance; the architecture of the building 
counts for less than the architecture of the information system: the panopticon becomes 
electronic (Lyon, 2001; Burrell, 1998, p.26)
20. In this electronic panopticon, control at a 
distance is nourished by a feeling of potentially permanent control rather than by the certainty 
of actual control. In a panoptical system, the controlled individual “must never know if he is 
currently being watched; but he must be sure that he may always be watched” (Foucault, 
1975, p.235). In the quotations that follow, the drug representatives are imbibed with this 
feeling of permanent surveillance that appears through the theme of tracking. They confuse 
the accumulation of data, the archiving of information and the use of this information for 
control purposes.  
 
S4 (DR): I’ve seen listings in the laboratory, in the IT department, where you see the names 
of DRs, the doctors they’ve seen, what they did. Everything is controlled. By means of our 
Teams messaging system, they have an immediate trace anyways.  
I: But then, is it used? 
S4: Well yes, it’s used. Yes, yes. They know what has been done and what hasn’t been done. 
They even know the averages for contacts from one division to another. There are also 
comparisons like that. It can be done. Anything can be done. In either a positive or a 
negative way.  
 
S3 (DR): I’ve never heard so much talk about recall tests in my life. I think that, with the IT 
systems, the infamous testers, they can phone the doctor from the next day onwards. […] 
With the IT connexion every evening, they have the info almost in real time. […] The 
information is more instantaneous. That means that, from the moment you are connected, 
they can check immediately. […] I think that they have increasingly advanced means. How 
is it used? I really don’t know. Because people are still people. […] Look, there was even a 
question… It’s also perhaps just a legend. But, in theory, on mobile phones there is a way to 
retrace someone’s day if they have left their mobile on and have used it. There was a rumour 
about France Telecom that said that, for a small supplementary subscription, companies that 
equipped employees with professional telephones could track representatives’ trips each day.  
Control therefore is not enacted through the real use of technology but rather, through the 
potential panopticon that it creates and thus the feeling of transparency that it induces. Control 
at a distance draws its power from the feeling the subordinate has that he may be constantly 
observed and that his activities may be permanently being watched. Moriceau stresses 
“visibility, because it unmasks or ignores, influences the structure by signifying to the 
managers the possibility and the probability of being observed. Their behaviour is modified 
accordingly […]” (Moriceau, 1997, p.184). More precisely, it is a matter, through this 
“conscious and permanent state of visibility” of ensuring the “automatic working of power” 
(Foucault, 1975, p. 234). “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
reclaims the constraints of power as his own; he makes them play spontaneously on himself; 
he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he plays simultaneously both roles; he 
becomes the principle of his own submission” (Foucault, 1975, p.236). 
                                                 
19 English edition: FOUCAULT M. (1979), Discipline and Punish, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
20 Foucault suggested this in “Discipline and Punish”, underlining that “The Panopticon is a machine for 
dissociating the couple see-be seen: in the outer ring, one is totally seen without ever seeing; in the central 
control tower, one sees everything without ever being seen” (Foucault, 1975, p.235). This is what is made 
possible notably by the electronic network. Foucault recognises that “communication circuits are supports for 
cumulating and centralising knowledge” (Foucault, 1975, p.252-253). 
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“The figures speak for themselves” or the ideal of quantification  
Technologies of control at a distance nourish an ideal of truth relying on a systematic 
quantification of the drug representative’s performance.  
 
I: But how do you believe that the RM can have a view of your activity?  
F2 (DR): He sees it in the figure, you know. Overall, the GERS gives you everything. Then 
it’s statistics.  
 
I: I imagine that there are not just figures in your goals? Do you have other goals?  
B2 (DR): […] You know, we do sales. The goals are to “improve myself”, but what does 
that mean other than selling more boxes? We always come back to this in the end […] each 
time, it comes down to numbers: how many PRs
21, how many contacts, and how many 
boxes.  
 
The previous quotation shows that the drug representative justifies the principle of technology 
quantification by mentioning the sector of activity: sales. Yet specifically, drug representation 
is not legally defined as a sales activity, as we have already highlighted. All facets of the 
representative’s performance are summarised in figures and it should be noted furthermore 
that stating in figures (number of PRs, number of visits, number of boxes sold) covers up the 
issue of the incommensurable link between the representative’s activity and the turnover 
achieved in his region. Consequently, the influence on individual behaviour is possible by 
calling upon quantified data, which is often both unique and financial. This kind of data is the 
principal outcome of most remote control technology. The ideal neutrality and objectivity that 
is required for any expertise lies within the unique figure. It is through this ideal translated 
into techniques that control at a distance, as well as accounting, claims legitimacy which 
appears to be above suspicion (Miller, 1994, p.29). 
 
Generally in the comments of the interviewees, technology-enabled quantification allows an 
illusion to be projected regarding their capacity to link calculation and discourse.  
W2 (DRM): There is what we call the bogus visit. […] Faced with this, there is a body that is 
called CAM that gives me the true returns. Then, it is not really the true returns… there is a 
disparity in the doctor’s ability to remember that always plays against me in some way. The 
disparity may come from a bogus visit, but foremost, it comes from a visit that hasn’t 
brought results. For me, it’s the same thing. Between “I really saw the client, I told him what 
I had to say, and nothing has resulted” and “I didn’t see a client”, the result is the same. You 
may say the second is a cheat and the first works badly, but for me, the bottom line is that, at 
150 euros per visit, I’ve lost 150 euros.  
To identify false statements in the drug representatives’ statements with regard to their 
activities, the laboratory calls on control technologies such as market studies and telephone 
surveys. The interviewee recognises that the calculation provided by these surveys does not 
necessarily inform him of the source of the problem encountered (a visit not remembered by a 
doctor may arise from something other than a false statement by the DR). What is surprising 
is that the interviewee reconciles this weakness by mentioning the first calculation enabling 
him to give meaning to the link between a cause and a consequence that do not have any link  
a priori. Here, the consequence is quantified in the opportunity cost (the 150-euro cost of a 
visit is lost) and this quantification becomes preponderant, making us forget the fact that we 
do not know the cause of the problem; it masks the fact that the technology is incapable of 
                                                 
21 PR: professional relationships 
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quantification, technologies provided ideally ‘strong’ knowledges in the sense developed by 
Robson: “the problem of truth-correspondence [between an inscription and the object to 
which it refers] is supplanted by that of action. The conditions for strong explanation become 
not truth but power to act. […] Hence, strong explanations are not explanations that are true to 
reality but rather the most powerful explanations through which to act upon all relevant 
contexts” (Robson 92, p.691). Technology provides such strong explanations; it does not 
indicate the cause of poor performance but enables to justify ex-post control and therefore 
potential sanctions (bonus cut, layoff). “Bringing together and making the same, rendering 
equivalent, things that were previously different allow actors to make calculation in 
accordance with their desires to act upon contexts.” (Robson, 1992, p.701).  
3.3. Control at a distance through technology: if it is not about external control, it is 
about self-control 
 
Our study shows that performance measurement technologies give pharmaceutical 
laboratories an illusion of external control over their sales forces, and notably the illusion that 
the reporting line perfectly controls a system based on the statements of the sales force. 
However, control at a distance is exerted nonetheless using the capacity of technologies to 
make performance data mobile, stable and combinable, a capacity that lies in two ideals that 
drive the technologies (permanent surveillance and truth through quantification). If this 
control at a distance is not external control, what then is its nature? In this section, we show 
that it is a matter of self-control.  
 
Self-control is the control that individuals exert on their own behaviour (Hopwood, 1974), as 
opposed to the influence exerted by other people or by the environment (Thomas, 1983)
22. 
Self-control does not consist in setting one’s rules oneself but in behaving as a responsible 
individual in the eyes of society or of the firm; that is to say, integrating the constraints of the 
organisation and rationalising them so as not, or no longer, questioning them (Dambrin, 
2005). Accounting technologies help to develop this attitude by the individual. Accounting 
power crosses with accounting knowledge to make individuals reflexively monitor and act 
upon the world in accordance with the norms and standards they accept as neutral and true 
(Foucault, 1975, 1982; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Robson 1992). Accounting has a self-
disciplining power; it informs the individual about his actions and makes him recognise his 
priorities (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1988; Robson & Cooper, 1989). Technologies of control at 
a distance, to which users appose an ideal of surveillance as we have seen, seamlessly slot 
into this development of self-control: “the continuous surveillance created by the accounts has 
the potential to create auto-regulatory effects […], the inscriptions that measure and survey 
the individual have also the potential for creating an internal form of control” (Robson, 1992 
p.700). This internal form of control results from the translation performed in control at a 
distance, which consists, as we have already highlighted, in translating the goals and values of 
others into one’s own terms (Miller & Rose, 1990). 
 
                                                 
22 A certain number of scholars (Drucker, 1954; McGregor, 1960; Dalton, 1971; Hopwood, 1974; Otley & Berry, 
1977; Parker, 1977) mention self-control as a control mode in its own right within organisations and distinguish 
it from control external to the individual. For instance, Hopwood (1974) and Dalton (1971) discern three 
complementary modes in organisational control: administrative control at the level of the formal system of 
procedures and rules; social control at the level of the group; and self-control at the level of each individual 
personality. 
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measurement technologies: self-control with regard to targeting doctors, and self-control with 
regard to setting quantitative goals of turnover to achieve. We show below that in each of 
these two cases, self-control, meaning the integration of organisational constraints, is fostered 
by technologies. Indeed, technology gives the illusion of autonomy; it makes the individual 
believe that he is participating in, even defining on his own terms, the elements of his control 
(targeting, turnover goals). Subsequently, the individual is all the more predisposed to judge 
the very heavy constraints the organisation imposes on him positively and to consider as 
autonomy what is the holding of no real power (Bouquin, 1998, p.168). 
 
The representatives often feel that they initiate their targeting while letting slip in their 
discourses the technological constraints that limit the amount of freedom they have.  
 
S4 (DR): In fact, we have some freedom… For example, the targeting I was talking about 
earlier. We are left… Well, even if we have guidelines to follow. We are nonetheless left 
some freedom to choose our doctors according to criteria established beforehand by the lab. 
But let’s say that there is someone you don’t want to see because you think that you don’t 
get on with him and he won’t prescribe a single box, we can say so. [...]  
I: Concretely, the last [targeting] you did: could you explain how it was done?  
S4: According to our products, we have intelligence. It’s called Icomed and Logimed. There 
is also a more precise analysis that is done. They buy from certain groups the prescriptions 
that come out of pharmacies [XPonent]. If we have that targeting, we know what is done. We 
must choose the doctors with a big potential. [...] In general, we make subgroups with our 
sector, per sector. And each person says, “We choose this one.” Well, anyways, we are 
obliged to choose all those that have a big potential. And after that, we add some more. We 
must have a certain number. [...] Then, we input them into the machine, the computer. 
Afterwards, the data’s churned in Paris and then a definitive targeting is sent to our computer 
later. 
 
In the preceding quotation, the drug representative begins by asserting his freedom in 
constituting his targeting, and then mentions the technologies that predefine it (Icomed, 
Logimed and Xponent). An ambiguity persists in his reasoning between the information that 
these technologies can provide (“intelligence”, “analysis”, “we know what is done”) and the 
constraints that they create (“we have guidelines to follow”, “we must choose”, “we must 
have a certain number”). Lastly, between the freedom asserted at the outset and the “data 
churning” at a distance that precedes the arrival of the targeting on the computer, a whole 
rationalisation is performed, mainly due to the ambiguity of the technologies mentioned that 
are both tools that assist operations and instruments of control.  
  
The quotation below, taken from the comments of the managing director of a firm providing 
technologies used in targeting, summarises well the essence of control at a distance through 
technologies: it is a matter of developing self-control in the individual, whereby he 
appropriates the organisational constraints.  
 
I: The representatives tell me that they qualify their doctors as small, medium or big 
prescribers.  
TT (MDP): No. The targeting is constituted by calling on data sources such as Icomed or 
Logimed. You also have information provided by TT on the prescription level of each doctor 
for all products combined (large, medium or small clientele). In accordance with all that, the 
laboratory draws up a list generally of three types of doctor. It is therefore not the 
representative who defines this. What we do, to be consensual, and so that the representative 
gets involved, is send him the list and tell him, “you can modify 10%”. Then, the 
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comply with it. But the fact that the representatives you have met tell you that it is they who 
classify the doctor is precisely the goal sought after by the laboratory! It has to be done by 
the Head Office and afterwards representatives appropriate it for themselves. But, quite 
frankly, the targeting is done elsewhere.  
 
Defining quantitative goals of turnover is the second area of performance measurement where 
the technologies of control at a distance foster the drug representative’s self-control. In the 
quotation, we observe confusion between individual participation in defining a plan of action 
and defining a goal of turnover. By participating in the development of a technology (and a 
technology is certainly not neutral because it acts on the pay rise during the annual appraisal), 
the drug representative believes himself to be the instigator of setting the quarterly goals that 
determine his bonuses.  
 
I: Is it your job to set a goal of turnover, for example, or days of treatment? Or does 
that depend on Head Office?  
A2 (DR): Well, we do that at the level of the action plan, we put our numbers of [doctors], 
business or rates. How many patients they are able to put on L., our product. We have 
forecast the level of their activity. And we get to a certain figure and we try to stick to that 
goal. But Head Office is not going to impose this figure on us. It calculates our goal 
according to criteria such as the market share of anti-cholesterol drugs, the dynamic of the 
competitive products and changes in the market.  
I don’t understand. In fact, there are two figures, then: Head Office’s calculation and 
your calculation as a rep? Yes. But which one will be taken into account for the bonus?  
Ah, for the bonus, it’s the Head Office’s goal. I don’t have it. […] The goals in terms of 
boxes are determined for us by Head Office. I can tell you them up until the month of 
December because I marked them down. This is all very confidential. Calculating the bonus 
is often very complicated. […] They mix it all together. And we have so much to do. There 
you go.  
So, in fact, there are two criteria. There is market share and goal attainment.  
Yes, that’s right: goal attainment and market share. And our bonuses are based solely on 
that. In fact, the sector plan of action will be more an end of year assessment. [...] It will be 
more at the level of know-how. 
 
The organisation therefore has two parallel systems coexisting for defining quantitative goals: 
one that involves the sales representative and one in which the Head Office imposes the goal. 
It is on this second system that the principles of short- and medium-term incentive are based, 
whereas the sales representative does not actually understand the calculations that underpin 
the rating criteria. The representative internalises these constraints (imposition of the goal and 
poor understanding of the calculation process) due to the existence of a parallel system in 
which he participates. Internalisation is manifest here in the confusion at the outset (he 
believes he is the instigator of his turnover goal) and in his referring to rational discourses to 
legitimise his poor understanding of the calculating processes (confidentiality, complexity).  
 
Technologies of control at a distance foster self-control because they make the individual 
aware of goals (on which criteria he is assessed) while keeping him in the dark with regard to 
the calculations that underpin these goals. For there to be self-control through technologies of 
control at a distance, the link between discourse and calculation must remain blurred
23. In 
contrast, the norms of behaviour and results that discourses and calculations entail must 
                                                 
23 It has an “interest” in remaining blurred because, as we have already highlighted, it is often groundless. The 
more aware the representative is of the incoherences between the norms of behaviour and the norms of results, 
the more difficult it is for him to appropriate them and internalise them.  
  29appear as very clear goals. Through A2’s testimony, we see that he knows full well on which 
discourse and calculation criteria his bonus hinges (the quantified goal of turnover and 
changes in market share). From these criteria, he deduces norms of behaviour and internalises 
the constraints because he was made to participate in parallel systems of setting goals. By 
knowing the goals fully, but not the link between the calculations and discourses, the 
representative is naturally led to give the best of him/herself to meet these goals. Here, we 
touch on the paradox of technologies of control at a distance: the self-control they engender 
makes us think of remote control. The technologies of control at a distance directly echo the 
disciplinary mechanism that feeds a “mechanic of power” according to Foucault’s 
terminology. This mechanic defines how we can hold sway over the bodies of others (not only 
over their achievements but also over the way they reach them) so that others “perform as we 
want, with the techniques and in line with the rapidity and efficiency we determine” 
(Foucault, 1975, p.162). 
 
4.  Discussion: Towards Three Complementary 
Interpretations of Governing through Technology 
 
By focusing on technologies, this research paper enables us to detail the role of translation in 
control at a distance. Control at a distance does not consist in linking established calculations 
to a place with actions performed in another place; the full weakness of the reality of this link 
has been shown (3.1). It is a matter of keeping this link blurred and inducing the conviction 
that this link is clear using technologies (3.2). This is what enables translation, in other words 
the individual’s appropriation of organisational constraints (3.3).  
 
Our study invites us to go beyond the definitions of control at a distance centred on how it 
functions and to envisage it equally in the light of its purposes. Control at a distance is self-
control that relies on technologies. It aims to develop a dominant economic order centred on 
the individual.  
Technologies of control at a distance function by creating and conveying information on the 
control subjects to the source of influence (mobility). They also function by guaranteeing 
stable information on these subjects (stability). Lastly, they function by enabling a combining 
of information on the control subjects (combinability). These three qualities are prerequisites 
to the process of translation. However, they do not suffice to explain the power of 
technologies of control at a distance to induce self-control. For this, we must look to the role 
of technologies (instigators of translation) rather than to the features of the information they 
diffuse (products of translation). Our study shows that this self-control resulting from 
technologies is possible because the technologies are driven by ideals. With regard to 
performance measurement technologies, their designers and users project onto them an ideal 
of permanent surveillance and an ideal of truth through quantification.  
 
Moreover, our study empirically analyses the behaviours of self-control stemming from the 
process of translation in the context of measuring sales performance. We show that 
technologies play a fundamental dual role in the development of these behaviours. Firstly, 
they enable a rationalisation of organisational constraints due to their ambivalence (they are 
both work tools and control instruments). Secondly, performance measurement technologies 
foster self-control because they make the individual aware of goals (on which criteria he is 
assessed) while keeping him in the dark with regard to the calculations that underpin these 
goals. More broadly, in order for there to be self-control through technologies of control at a 
  30distance, the link between the discourses on performance and the calculations that underpin 
them must remain blurred.  
 
The analysis of technologies of control at a distance that we have proposed offers another 
interpretation of power in its ‘modern’ forms
24. Distance is a source of problem for 
controlling but, at the same time, it is also a source of power since it enables those who are 
distanced from a setting to act upon that setting through power/knowledge inscriptions 
(Robson, 1992, p.691). Our findings move towards reconsidering power in its relation with 
knowledge and suggest three forms of complementary interpretation of governing through 
technologies:  critical, strategic and socio-institutional.  
In the critical perspective, technologies of control at a distance are criticised for their 
alienating power. Through technologies of control at a distance, “senior managers discover 
ways to influence individuals’ motivations by teaching managers to control themselves and 
correct themselves. And this aptitude to ingrain a sense of self-discipline in employees in the 
field has become a much more effective control means than anything administrators have 
been able to do using the information conveyed upwards to senior management thanks to the 
control system” (Le Goff, 2000). This critical view of control at a distance is nonetheless 
nuanced in two ways in this paper. Firstly, the individuals interviewed are not taken in by the 
false autonomy that control at a distance instils. They are often lucid to the effects of the 
technologies. Although they may not immediately speak of the structuring impact, they 
recognise them relatively quickly. Secondly, they can also exploit the technologies to serve 
their own interests. In this respect, we touch on the limits of the Marxist analytical perspective 
that focuses on the subordinate’s bondage to technologies implemented by senior managers. 
This suggests going beyond ascribing control at a distance to the class struggle, notably 
because any device is overridden by the ways it is used and always contributes to 
manufacturing what was not foreseen (Miller & Rose, 1990; Boussard & Maugeri, 2003). 
Nonetheless, our study’s findings show that a second view of control at a distance, while 
purposefully complementing a critical perspective, is not satisfactory. In this strategic 
perspective, the unexpected effects of control at a distance stem, most of the time, from their 
users’ diverting control technologies (for example, in our study, the use of the ETMS to input 
bogus visits). Seeing technology solely through the actors’ gaming presupposes an 
excessively instrumental view of man. Thus our research suggests blending the critical and 
strategic viewpoints of technologies of control at a distance with a third interpretation of their 
effects: envisaging them as a practice of government aimed at developing an economic 
citizenship. In our paper, we show how control at a distance influences individual conduct in 
order to compensate for a decrease in rationality. Technologies of control at a  distance 
transform the conduct of the firm and of the individual and thus contribute to building a new 
economic order (Miller & O’Leary, 1994b). This view of control at a distance ascribing to a 
programme of governing the individual calls into question the role endowed by certain 
scholars on accounting in control at a distance. For instance, although Johnson questions the 
relevance of accounting indicators for controlling at a distance (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987), he 
does not see in control at a distance a device for governing the individual but rather a 
functional tool that responds to the organisational imperatives of efficiency (Johnson, 1991). 
Our study shows that control at a distance through technology, based on an illusory 
articulation between calculations and discourses, integrates into a socio-economic project of 
self-control. The bondage of and the latitude granted to the individual, seemingly 
incompatible in the two previous perspectives (critical and strategic), are in fact conjugated in 
                                                 
24 Here, we confer on this term the meaning that Lyon gives in this analysis of modern surveillance societies. 
According to this scholar, modernity means the use of information and knowledge to maintain and create power 
(Lyon, 2001, p.31). 
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develop personal initiatives and simultaneously strengthens power centralised in the control 
technologies. This control mechanism, dynamic and flexible, drives individuals to self-
discipline within the context of constant talk of responsibility and need for accountability 
(Hoskin & Macve, 1994, p.91). The governmentality nourished by control at a distance 
therefore denies the uniquely repressive character of power. The power created produces a 
new reality through the normalisation of behaviours that it entails (Foucault, 1984, 1994 ; 
Starkey, 2002; Amintas, 2002; Pezet, 2004; Lambert & Pezet, forthcoming). This power lies 
in the capacity to act in a way that individuals voluntarily comply with and nourish norms. In 
this form of government, control at a distance models the economic and social behaviour of 
various and institutionally distinct agents without destroying their autonomous character 
(Miller & Rose, 1990, p.14). This final socio-institutional perspective therefore allows 
technologies of control at a distance to be thought of differently than as purely disciplinary 
mechanisms for enforcing servitude or as devices that only live through what their designers 




Our case study on performance measurement technologies revisits the concept of control at a 
distance, its functioning, its effects and its purposes. Our findings illustrate the rising trend 
towards implementing technologies that mediate between employees and corporate senior 
managements. In the 19
th century, discipline in the firm was embodied in the direct 
confrontations between the workers and the boss. At the beginning of the 20
th century, 
employees were submerged in quantified norms and standards that were placed between them 
and their boss. Accounting is actually considered one of the pillars of the development of 
these calculating techniques (Miller & O’Leary, 1987, p.239). Little by little, discipline was 
no longer embodied by the boss’s will but by the economic machine itself, in which the 
technologies compensated for the disappearance of bodies in relationships of supervision 
(Lyon, 2001, p.8, 15). With respect to this observation of the virtualisation of control, our 
study empirically shows the ways in which technologies take part in developing self-control. 
Moreover, it captures behaviours of self-control induced by technologies in particular 
organisational contexts whereas these behaviours are usually only referred to theoretically. 
This work thus revisits the concept of translation at a level of analysis that is uncommon in 
accounting literature, inspired by the research of Callon and Latour:  the level of the subject.  
 
In this paper, we have analysed the characteristics of the translation process, on which control 
at a distance in the pharmaceutical industry relies. Translation is based on the right link 
between calculations and discourse underlying technology. However, ‘right’ does not mean 
real. Technologies of control at a distance observed in the pharmaceutical industry actually 
link calculations and discourses artificially. Thus, ‘right’ means rationalised by the users of 
this technology, whether institutions or individuals. This rationalisation is only possible as 
technology creates mobile, stable and combinable information and is driven by ideals 
(permanent surveillance, truth through quantification). It is these features of technologies that 
lead the individual to integrate the organisational constraints, i.e. control himself. In this 
context, problems of articulation between calculation and discourse that characterise 
technologies of control at a distance have not been solved in the interest of the different actors 
in the pharmaceutical industry: they allow margin of manoeuvre and an integration of 
constraints by the sales force, and they enable the laboratories to treat drug representatives as 
if they were sales representatives while complying with the legal constraints in this matter. 
Technologies of control at a distance therefore renew the myth of control: they give the 
  32illusion of the organisation’s external control of its members and they foster an internalised 
control by the members, which ascribes to a programme of governing the individual.  
 
This research paper invites us to dig deeper into the link between technologies and the 
programmes that inspire them at the macro level. Understanding control at a distance and the 
role of technologies in this control would gain in relevance notably by expanding data 
gathering to include decision-making and regulatory bodies. With respect to the 
pharmaceutical industry, this would imply conducting research into control technologies in 
hospitals, wholesaler-distributors that manage the indirect orders from pharmacies, trade 
organisations and regulatory bodies such as drug agencies. Studying alliances between the 
private and public sectors gives insight into the exercise of power in liberal democracies 
(Rose & Miller, 1992). However, “the matrix that brings together actors, agencies, goals, and 
policy aspirations are too complex to be fully analysed within a single study” (Miller, 1994, 
p.30). Although our research analyses the relationships between subject and technology, 
additional research is needed to move up to the level of socio-institutional problematisation 
(Miller, 1991). This implies investigating, beyond what is done in this research, the purposes 
of control at a distance. If the goal of control is to improve productivity, we may think, as do 
Miller and Rose, that control at a distance is destined for failure: “productivity, flexibility and 
competitivity will remain unattainable goals” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p.27). If the goal is to 
enable connections among political wills, the wills of the shareholders and the wills of 
individual actors in order to ensure sound government of the individual and of society in 
general, then control at a distance, through technologies and the self-control they instil, 
appears to be a form of government that is both efficient and formidable in making the 
barriers between the economic, the social and the psychological disappear.  
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Effiker 
Pharmaceutical 
laboratory     NA   NA   NA 
GlaxoSmithKline 
Pharmaceutical 
laboratory  British 
£21,441 (i.e.
$42,002) 
   £4,484 (i.e. $8,784) 












laboratory  American  $41,862   $7,197 (net income) 11,600 
LFB 
Pharmaceutical 
laboratory  French  €227  (i.e. $295)   NA  1,158 
Lundbeck 
Pharmaceutical 
laboratory  Danish 
DKK9,941 (i.e.
$1,725) 
  DKK1,337 (i.e. 





laboratory  Franco- 
American  $22,486   $6,831   63,200 
Pfizer 
Pharmaceutical 
laboratory  American  $45,188   $3,910 (net income)  122,000 
Sanofi 
Pharmaceutical 
laboratory  French  €220  (i.e. $284)  €102 (i.e. $131)  33,086 
  38Appendix 2 Task reporting of a drug representative in one ETMS 
 
Source: Demonstration given by Z2(DR) during an interview 
Month: September   
01/09/2003  02/09/2003  03/09/2003 etc.  Total for the month 
Visits to doctors 
(all doctors, even 
those not in the 
DR’s target)  
   7 8  
Doctors visited 
(doctors belonging 
to the target) 
Number, code colour 
and link to 
identification sheet  
3 8 69 
Visits to pharmacists:  
Pharmacists  visited      
PR (professional relationships): 




for a PR 
    
Potential in field 














Number of doctors 




Colour code for figures: 
Green = mixed activity (e.g. visit + training, visit + meeting) 
Blue = single-activity day with fewer than 4 visits during the day. For instance, the last days of September 
appear in blue on the screen because activity has not been computed yet in the ETMS.  
Red = Days for which the DR has already made a synchronisation (computed the information in the ETMS) and 
during which there have been fewer than 4 visits.   
Specific signs for days devoted to Professional Relationships, for dual-activity days, for holidays, for training, 
and for computer synchronisation.  
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